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Is There a Legal Recourse
Available in New York When the
Press Fails to Protect the Identity
of a Child Abuse Victim?
Hon. John H. Wilson*
I. Introduction
In October of 2010, while reading through my local
newspaper, I came across a photo of an eleven-year-old girl,
next to a headline which identified her as a rape victim. Even
more shocking, the article which accompanied the photo gave
the child’s name, identified her residence and school, and
included details of the acts allegedly committed upon her.1
I immediately contacted the Office of the District Attorney
to determine how this information reached the press. I was
informed that the child had initially been missing, and her
information had been released to the press in an effort to solicit
their help in finding her. Subsequently, the child was found in
the company of an individual who was indicted for Predatory
Sexual Assault Against a Child.2
This circumstance led to the question which has resulted
in this Article—what rights and remedies does the victim of an
alleged crime have when her identity is revealed by the press?
II.Consideration of Journalistic Ethical Standards
There is no doubt that the publication of the identity of a
victim of a sexual assault constitutes a serious breach of
journalist ethics. The Code of Ethics (the “Code”) promulgated
by the Society of Professional Journalists specifically states,
* In an effort to safeguard the identity of the child, no citation to the
article described above will be provided here.
2. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.96 (McKinney 2006).
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under the section entitled “Minimize Harm,” “[b]e cautious
about identifying juvenile suspects or victims of sex crimes.”3
However, at the conclusion of the Code, the Society
acknowledges that “[t]he SPJ Code of Ethics is voluntarily
embraced by thousands of journalists . . . [t]he code is intended
not as a set of ‘rules’ but as a resource for ethical decisionmaking. It is not—nor can it be under the First Amendment—
legally enforceable.”4
In 2010, the Crimes Against Children Research Center
(the “Center”) published a comprehensive study of the impact
publicity of their status as crime victims can have on children.5
Citing research conducted over the past thirty years, the
Center found that the “negative emotional and social
consequences for victims” included post-traumatic stress
disorder, depression, and psychological distress “for children as
well as adults and for both sexual and physical abuse victims.”6
Noting that “[t]he media community is clearly aware of the
potential harm for victims in disclosing their identity when
reporting on crime,”7 the Center also found that “[t]here seems
to be some consensus in the field that the privacy of certain
types of victims in particular should be protected.”8
Nonetheless, in a survey of newspaper articles conducted
by the Center, which discussed allegations of physical and nonphysical abuse of adult and child victims, the Center reported
that “[i]n 51 percent of the articles [] reviewed, at least one
type of identifying information about the child [was] included . .
. . The most directly identifying source of information, the
child’s name, was included in 9 percent of the child
victimization articles.”9

3. CODE OF ETHICS (Soc'y of Prof'l Journalists 1996), available at
http://www.spj.org/ethicscode.asp.
4. Id. (emphasis added).
5. Lisa M. Jones, et al., Protecting Victims’ Identities in Press Coverage
of Child Victimization, 11 JOURNALISM 347 (2010).
6. Id. at 348.
7. Id. at 350.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 353.
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The Center continued:
While information about children seemed to
be more protected in articles covering child sex
abuse, we nonetheless found that potentially
identifying information was often included. In 4
percent of articles, the child’s street name or
address was included. . . . In 12 percent of
articles, a family member offender’s name was
given along with information about his or her
relationship to the child. At least one of the
above victim identifiers was included in 37
percent of the articles covering child sexual
victimization.10
Specifically, the Center noted that one “situation often
used to justify the use of a child victim’s name is when the
identity has been previously disclosed; for example, as part of
an earlier investigation for a missing child.”11 However,
“additional public identification may indeed cause further
harm that could be avoided. . . . [A] possible practice might be
to withhold details about the crimes committed, particularly
sexual crimes, if a child victim’s identity has been previously
divulged.”12
Thus, under the rules discussed above, there can be no
denying that my local newspaper exhibited an utter disregard
for the ethical rules explored here. However, it is equally
inescapable that there is no practical penalty for this conduct—
no, “Discipline Committee” for violations of journalistic ethics.
There can be no denying that a news provider’s disregard
for the privacy of a crime victim can have serious consequences.
In November of 2010, a fourteen-year-old girl committed
suicide after being bullied by classmates after it was revealed
in the media that she had accused a classmate of rape.13 As a
10. Id. at 354.
11. Id. at 361.
12. Id.
13. Girl Kills Self After Being Bullied Over Rape Allegations, AOL NEWS
(Nov. 10, 2010, 5:51 PM), http://www.aolnews.com/2010/11/10/girl-kills-selfafter-being-bullied-over-rape-allegations/.
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result, prosecutors in Wayne County, Michigan were forced to
drop charges against the accused rapist.14
“[P]rosecutors did not know [the girl] was being harassed
until after a local TV broadcast ran an interview that identified
the girl’s mother. ‘Although the child’s face was not seen, when
the mother was interviewed, essentially the child’s identity was
revealed,’ . . . . ‘After the broadcast . . . the child was harassed
at school.’”15
What, then, are the legal remedies for a child sexual abuse
victim, who has had her identity revealed in the press?
III.Privacy Laws and Their Applicability
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press.”16 This principle has also
been incorporated into the Constitution of New York State,
which states that “[n]o law shall be passed to restrain or
abridge the liberty of speech or of the press.”17
An action for libel is the usual first choice for an action
against the press; however, before a private citizen may
maintain a libel action, a publisher must have “actual
knowledge of the falsity” of a published statement, or “reckless
disregard for the truth.”18 Here, in the example from my local
newspaper, there is no reason to believe the news story is
untrue, and a truthful news story is protected speech under the
First Amendment.19
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,20 the United States
Supreme Court ruled that “actual malice was held to be the
constitutional standard in determining the libel claims of
plaintiffs.” 21 That standard was originally applied to public
14. See id.
15. Id.
16. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
17. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8.
18. Doe v. Daily News, L.P., 632 N.Y.S.2d 750, 754 (Sup. Ct. 1995).
19. Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986).
20. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
21. Doe, 632 N.Y.S.2d at 754 (citing N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279-81).
Note that the Doe Court was critical of the Sullivan decision, stating that
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figures; however, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the Supreme
Court extended the actual malice requirement to actions
brought by private individuals.22 Thus, though the eleven-yearold and her family may attempt to proceed under the definition
of libel given in New York’s Pattern Jury Instruction—”the
statement was defamatory, meaning that the statement had a
tendency to expose the plaintiff to public hatred, contempt,
ridicule or disgrace”23—they could not succeed in establishing
malice. To do that, a “plaintiff must prove that the statement
was false, meaning substantially untrue” and that the
defendant published the statement in a grossly irresponsible
manner without consideration for the standards of information
gathering and dissemination followed by responsible parties.24
In fact, even if the statements published in my local paper
were untrue, when a reporter relies upon statements provided
by law enforcement, whether sworn or unsworn, and that
reporter has no reason to doubt the accuracy of the information
supplied, an action for libel cannot be maintained.25
The next ground for a civil action to be considered would be
for a violation of the right to privacy. However, there is no right
to privacy under the common law of New York State.26 “[I]n
this State, the right to privacy is governed exclusively by
sections 50 and 51 of the Civil Rights Law . . . .”27
There are states where a common law right to privacy
exists.28 Prosser’s Second Restatement of Torts identifies four
“privacy” torts: “unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of
another,” “appropriation of the other’s name or likeness,”

“Justice Brennan created a doctrine of actual malice based on a less favored
common law definition which focused on bad faith by the publisher. Rather
than adopting the common law malice standard outright .” Id. (internal
citations omitted).
22. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348-50 (1974).
23. N.Y. P.J.I. Civ. 3:23A (3d ed. 2000).
24. Id.
25. See Mitchell v. Herald Co., 529 N.Y.S.2d 602, 605 (App. Div. 1988)
(citations omitted).
26. See Howell v. N.Y. Post Co., 612 N.E.2d 699, 703-04 (N.Y. 1993).
27. Id. at 703.
28. See Nappier v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 322 F.2d 502, 505
(4th Cir. 1963) (using the right to privacy as a basis for recovery where a
television newscast identified two rape victims).
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“unreasonable publicity given to the other’s private life,” and
“publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light
before the public.”29 Thus, there is a considerable body of law
involving claims against news-gatherers for various forms of
invasion of privacy outside of New York.30
Under New York’s Civil Rights Law Section 51, civil
liability may attach if a person’s “name, portrait, picture or
voice is used . . . for advertising purposes or for the purposes of
trade without . . . written consent”31 However, “[t]he use of
one’s name or likeness in the publication and sale of
newspapers is considered a First Amendment right of ‘free
press’ and not ‘trade,’ provided there is a reasonable
relationship between the individual and the newsworthy
issue.”32 Thus, the clear and “unmistakable intent” of Civil
Rights Law Section 51 “is to protect the property right of an
individual’s likeness from commercial exploitation.”33
Section 50, and in particular, Section 50-b, is intended to
prevent public officers and employees from disclosing
information about crime victims. In fact, Sec. 50-b(1)
specifically states that “[t]he identity of any victim of a sex
offense . . . shall be confidential. No report, paper, picture,
photograph, court file or other documents, in the custody or
possession of any public officer or employee, which identifies
such a victim shall be made available for public inspection.”34
While there is a private right of action for wrongful disclosure
under Civil Rights Law Section 50-c,35 that section imposes
“civil liability upon governmental entities that disclose the
identity of a sex crime victim in violation of section 50-b” not
non-public employees and organizations.36
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977).
30. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991); see also Nathan
Siegel, Publication Damages in Newsgathering Cases, COMM. LAW., Summer
2001, at 11 (“Cohen involved a claim that a newspaper published the identity
of a source in breach of a promise to maintain [the source’s] confidentiality.”).
31. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney 1995).
32. Padraic D. Lee, Howell v. New York Post: Patient Rights Versus the
Press, 15 PACE L. REV. 459, 469 (1995).
33. Id.
34. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50-b(1) (McKinney 2006).
35. Id. § 50-c.
36. Fappiano v. N.Y.C. Police Dept., 747 N.E.2d 1286, 1291 (N.Y. 2001).
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Thus, the disclosure in a public newspaper of the identity
of a child who is the victim of a sexual assault is not actionable
under New York’s Civil Rights Law.
There is, however, one possible recourse available against
a New York newspaper for the conduct at issue here—an action
for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. As we shall
see, however, this is an extremely weak option.
The seminal case on this issue is Howell v. New York Post
Co.37 There, a newspaper photographer trespassed on the
grounds of the Four Winds Psychiatric Hospital in an attempt
to take a photo of Hedda Nussbaum, “the ‘adoptive’ mother of
six-year-old Lisa Steinberg, whose November 1987 death from
child abuse generated intense public interest.”38 The reporter
succeeded in his mission, and the resulting photo of Ms.
Nussbaum was published on the front page of the New York
Post.39
The photo included a clear image of Mrs. Howell, who was
walking with Ms. Nussbaum at the time the photo was taken.40
Mrs. Howell had taken great pains to conceal her
hospitalization from her family.41 Thus, once her status as a
patient at a psychiatric facility was revealed, she sued the New
York Post for a series of torts, including the intentional
infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy.42 These
two causes of action were the only ones to reach consideration
by the New York Court of Appeals.43
In considering Mrs. Howell’s claim for an invasion of
privacy, the court noted the lack of a common law right to
privacy in New York State law.44 Thus, her only recourse under
statutory law would be under Civil Rights Law Section 50 or
51, which, as we have seen, is inapplicable. “[C]ourts have
37. Howell v. N.Y. Post Co., 612 N.E.2d 699 (N.Y. 1993).
38. Id. at 700.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Howell v. N.Y. Post Co., No. 43723/89, 1990 WL 10587771, at *2
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 12, 1990).
42. Howell, 612 N.E.2d at 701-03.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 703.
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consistently held that the statute should not be construed to
apply to publications concerning newsworthy events or matters
of public interest. This is both a matter of legislative intent and
a reflection of constitutional values in the area of free speech
and free press.”45
To succeed under the Civil Rights Law, the plaintiff would
have to show that her picture “bore no real relationship to the
article, or that the article was an advertisement in disguise.”46
Specifically finding that Mrs. Howell had “failed to meet her
burden,”47 the Court of Appeals found that “there is a real
relationship between the article and the photograph of
plaintiff, and the civil rights cause of action was properly
dismissed.”48 This left only a claim for the intentional infliction
of emotional distress.49
This was another tort not recognized by the common law of
New York, “even with physical manifestations—as an
independent basis for recovery.”50 However, over the years, the
courts of New York accepted this cause of action, which is
described in the Second Restatement of Torts as “[o]ne who by
extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly
causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to
liability for such emotional distress.”51
The Court of Appeals identified four elements to this cause
45. Id. (internal citations omitted).
46. Id. at 704.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. We do not discuss the cause of action for the “negligent” infliction of
emotional distress since, in this context, the courts of New York have roundly
rejected recovery from the media on this basis. “Recovery for negligent
infliction of emotional distress would completely overwhelm the whole matrix
of defamation and privacy torts.” RODNEY A. SMOLIA, RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES
IN MEDIA CONTENT § 8:7 (2d ed. 2010). See Rubinstein v. N.Y. Post Co., 488
N.Y.S.2d 331, 332 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (where the defendant newspaper printed
an erroneous obituary for the plaintiff and rejected the plaintiff’s claim that
the newspaper “‘negligently and carelessly published false information.’”); see
also Greenwood v. Daily News L.P., No. 4292/05, 2005 WL 1389052 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. June 7, 2005). The Court in Rubinstein held, “[a] plaintiff cannot
avoid the constitutional protections afforded to publications by alleging as an
alternative theory ‘the negligent infliction of harm.’” Rubinstein, 488
N.Y.S.2d at 333.
50. Howell, 612 N.E.2d at 701.
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
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of action: “(i) extreme and outrageous conduct; (ii) intent to
cause, or disregard of a substantial probability to causing,
severe emotional distress; (iii) a causal connection between the
conduct and injury; and (iv) severe emotional distress.”52 The
emphasis, however, has been on the “outrageous conduct”
element, which “serves the dual function of filtering out petty
and trivial complaints . . . and assuring that plaintiff’s claim of
severe emotional distress is genuine.”53
“Liability has been found only where the conduct has been
so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go
beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as
atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community,”54 a
standard so high that, “of the intentional infliction of emotional
distress claims considered by this Court, every one has failed
because the alleged conduct was not sufficiently outrageous.”55
Thus, Ms Howell’s cause of action was dismissed—
”publication [of the photograph]—without more—could not
ordinarily lead to liability for intentional infliction of emotional
distress.”56 Specifically, the court found that the publication of
the photograph was “qualifiedly privileged—meaning that
defendants acted within their legal right” in publishing said
photo.57 This holds true “even if defendants were aware that
publication would cause plaintiff emotional distress,”58 since
“‘the actor is never liable . . . where [the actor] has done no
more than to insist upon his [or her] legal rights in a
permissible way.’”59
However, in language which left open the door to future
litigation, the Court of Appeals stated that “[w]e do not mean to
suggest . . . that a plaintiff could never . . . state a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. . . . [W]e need not
explore today what circumstances might overcome the
52. Howell, 612 N.E.2d at 702.
53. Id.
54. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 705.
57. Id. at 704.
58. Id. at 705.
59. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 46 cmt. g (1965)).
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privilege.”60
This simple dicta has led to a series of attempts to find the
“circumstances” which could “overcome the privilege.” The
cases are legion, but several examples will suffice for our
purposes here.
In Howe v. New York Post Co.,61 former New York Yankee
Steve Howe sought damages for the publication of an item
regarding his refusal to accept a marijuana cigarette offered to
him. Even though the newspaper admitted that the item was
false, the publication of this article did not constitute “extreme
and outrageous conduct.”62 Thus, Howe’s cause of action for the
intentional infliction of emotional distress was dismissed.63
In AVA v. NYP Holdings, Inc.,64 the plaintiff, who “was
born a biological male but has been diagnosed with ‘Gender
Identity Disorder’ and identifies herself as a female,”65 sued the
New York Post for an article that revealed the plaintiff’s
condition.66 While the First Department decision addressed the
plaintiff’s cause of action for defamation,67 the lower court had
considered the plaintiff’s claim for the intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Here, even when it had been revealed that
she was a he, “the conduct complained of . . . fail[s] to establish
a separate cause of action for emotional distress.”68
Recently, in Uzamere v. Daily News, LP,69 plaintiff sought
damages for the publication of an article entitled, “Hatespewing wacko goes into fit in court.” Alleging causes of action
in defamation, fraud, violation of constitutional rights and the
intentional infliction of emotional distress,70 the pro se plaintiff
took issue with “the article’s statement concerning Plaintiff’s
60. Id.
61. Howe v. N.Y. Post Co., No. 124519/93, 1995 WL 572884 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Mar. 7, 1995).
62. Id. at *3.
63. Id. at *4.
64. Ava v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 885 N.Y.S.2d 247 (App. Div. 2009)
65. Id. at 248 n.1.
66. Id. at 250.
67. Id. at 252.
68. Ava v. NYP Holdings, Inc., No. 115597/07, 2008 WL 2522631, at *5
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 24, 2008).
69. No. 403205/10, 2011 WL 6934526 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 10, 2011).
70. Id. at *1.
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alleged anti-Semitism.”71
In dismissing the matter in its entirety, the Court noted
the plaintiff’s publication on her website of “a number of
postings that, by any objective measure, can only be described
Thus,
“the
article’s
as
virulently
anti-Semitic.”72
characterization of plaintiff as a ‘wacko’ is a non-actionable
statement of opinion.”73
In particular, Ms. Uzamere was unable “to state a claim
for the intentional infliction of emotional distress,”74 since she
failed to allege any conduct “so outrageous in character, and so
extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of
decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly
intolerable in a civilized society.”75
There are instances where the conduct alleged was
considered to have been sufficiently outrageous to allow
submission of the case to a jury. Though the First Department
case of Doe v. American Broadcasting Cos. was a decision
rendered against the plaintiffs, the dissent by Justice
Rosenberger is instructive.76
The plaintiffs in Doe were rape victims who had been
interviewed for a television news broadcast on the topic of
rape.77 “The plaintiffs were approached to participate in the
proposed program. They expressed great concern for their
anonymity. They received repeated assurances from defendants
that neither their faces nor their voices would be recognizable .
. . .”78 Unfortunately, one of the plaintiffs’ employers recognized
her on a television advertisement for the news report.79
The majority in Doe ruled that “[d]efendants’ actions here
did not constitute the intentional, deliberate and outrageous
conduct necessary” to maintain a cause of action for the
71. Id. at *2.
72. Id.
73. Id. at *3.
74. Id. at *4.
75. Id. (quoting Brown v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 297 A.D.2d 205, 212
(N.Y. App. Div. 2002).
76. Doe v. Am. Broad. Cos., 543 N.Y.S.2d 455, 456 (App. Div. 1989).
77. Id. (Rosenberger, J., dissenting).
78. Id.
79. Id.
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intentional infliction of emotional distress.80 However, the
dissent felt that the plaintiffs allegations “raises questions of
fact as to whether [the defendants’] actions were so extreme
and outrageous as to be regarded as intolerable.”81
It was not until the decision in Roach v. Stern82 that the
Second Department revisited and followed the dissent in Doe.
There, “shock-jock” Howard Stern was sued by the family of
Deborah Roach, aka, Debbie Tay, a “perennial guest” on the
Stern show, who had died of a drug overdose.83 A family friend,
who had been trusted with a portion of the ashes of Ms. Roach,
had brought these remains to Stern, who proceeded to sift
through the ashes on the air.84 “[P]articipants in the broadcast
made comments about the remains while handling various
bone fragments. . . . Stern at one point . . . held up certain bone
fragments while he guessed whether they came from Tay’s
skull or ribs.”85
The lower court had dismissed the cause of action for
intentional infliction of emotion distress; however, the Second
Department disagreed. “[W]e conclude that the Supreme Court
erred in determining that the element of outrageous conduct
was not satisfied as a matter of law. . . . [A] jury might
reasonably conclude that the manner in which Tay’s remains
were handled . . . went beyond the bounds of decent
behavior.”86
IV.Conclusion
Where then does this leave the eleven year-old victim of an
alleged sexual crime, who has been identified by name, whose
residence and school have been revealed, and whose
photograph has been published by an irresponsible local
newspaper? Would this be considered “outrageous conduct,”
“well beyond the bounds of decent behavior?”
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. (majority opinion).
Id. (Rosenberger, J., dissenting).
Roach v. Stern, 675 N.Y.S.2d 133 (App. Div. 1998).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 134.
Id. at 136.
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The case law examined above is not encouraging. The
allegations, after all, are newsworthy, do not appear to exhibit
any actual malice, and are actual accusations being made
against a criminal defendant, who has been indicted. Thus, it is
reasonable for the publishers of this information to rely upon a
strong presumption of privilege.
It is, however, equally reasonable for a jury to be allowed
to consider whether or not this conduct is “beyond the bounds
of decent behavior,” and constitutes the intentional infliction of
emotional distress, as occurred in Roach v. Stern.87
We, as a profession, are bound by ethical rules, which, if
violated, can lead to disciplinary action, or even civil and/or
criminal penalties. But not all professions have ethical
considerations that are binding. Some professions, such as
journalism, follow their ethical norms on a purely voluntary
basis. Sometimes, this means that there is no effective legal
recourse for the violation of these voluntary, non-binding
ethical guidelines, even when the violation of these ethical
norms have unintended, serious, and sometimes deadly
consequences.
But, conversely, there are times when the violation of the
privacy of an individual will be actionable. As practitioners and
interpreters of the law, we must stand ready to provide justice
for that individual.

87. See id.

13

